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CHAPTER IV

SEMI-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

INTRODUCTION
1. GENERAL
One of the outstanding features of a totalitarian
state is the facility with which governmental agencies
can be applied to military effort. During World
War II, all agencies of the U. S. S. R. and the Com·
munist Party were devoted, in varying degree, to
military purposes.
The transition of agencies and individuals between civil and military positions within the Soviet
Union has always been extremely fluid. A number
of semiofficial bodies, commissariats, and main administrations were, however, specifically brought
into the military structure during World War II.
These organizations included those temporarily incorporated into the Red Army or Navy, those given
the status of armed forces, those legally militarized,
and the Partisans.
2. AGENCIES INCORPORATED INTO ARMY AND
NAVY
The most important agencies temporarily incorporated into the Red Army and Navy were the Main
Administrations of the Civil Air Fleet, the HydroMeteorological Service, and the Northern Sea Route.
In addition, the Main Administration for Universal
Compulsory Military Training of the Citizens of the
U. S. S. R. (Vsevobuch) was organized in 1941 to
place the semiofficial and voluntary training activities carried on by the national Organization for the
Defense of the Soviet Union and Defense against
Air Raids and Chemical Attack (Osoaviakhim) under military control and on a compulsory basis.
3. AGENCIES GIVEN ARMED FORCE STATUS

Even before World War II, troops of the Peoples'
Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) had the
legal status of an armed force equivalent to the Red
Army and Navy. Its authority was extensive. It
maintained border guards and strategic security
forces, controlled all local police and fire departments, conducted foreign espionage, and conducted
687638°-46

counterespionage among the civil population and in
the army and the navy.
The Soviet government carefully controlled the
functions of the NKVD. The Army was made responsible for its own internal security in 1943.
Secret domestic counterespionage and foreign espio·
nage functions were given to the newly organized
Peoples' Commissariat of State Security (NKGB).
The NKGB also was given the status of an armed
force.
4. AGENCIES LEGALLY MILITARIZED

Because the operation of transportation and signal
communications systems had to be coordinated
closely with the requirements of the Red Army and
Navy, the Soviet government legally militarized the
Commissariats of Signal Communications, Transportation, Waterways, and the Maritime Fleet. Repeated enemy attacks also necessitated their militarization. Personnel in these organizations were
subjected to martial authority and, in most instances,
were given army or navy ranks. They wore special
uniforms.
5. PARTISANS

The organization of the Partisan movement in the
areas of the U. S. S. R. occupied by the Germans
and in other countries overrun by German forces is
the only exception to the rule that the Communist
Party does not maintain an armed force within the
Soviet state.
Early in World War II, the Central ~ommittee of
the Communist Party directly commanded and ad·
ministered all Partisan activities through the Commander in Chief of the Partisans. Operational coordination of Partisan activities was taken over by
the General Headquarters and by army group
(front) headquarters in the field as the Red Army
assumed the offensive. Once an area was reoccupied, control over all Partisans was assumed by the
Chief of Security Troops, who commanded all
NKVD forces within each army group zone.
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Occasionally, Partisans in reoccupied areas were
organized into "destruction battalions" to assist in
the mopping up of the remnants of German forces.
All Partisans, however, ultimately were disarmed
and screened by the NKVD. Some were drafted into
field replacement units. Some were given respon·
sible local positions with the NKVD or civilian authorities, and some were sent to the rear as unreliable
elements. The secret agents of the Occupied Territories Administration of the NKGB assisted the
NKVD screen Partisans.
6. EFFECTIVENESS

Semi-military organizations generally proved to be
of marked usefulness in the Soviet war effort. Partisans were of strategic importance in impeding German operations. The NKVD and NKGB consolidated the rear area of the Red Army and protected
the zone of the interior. A considerable number of
German remnants and isolated dissident groups were
controlled so effectively that they never interfered
seriously with military operations. The signal communications and transportation systems of the U. S.
S. R. were able to accomplish their missions successfully despite a partial break-down in the winter and
spring of 1942 and despite serious shortages.
In contrast, V sevobuch achieved only limited
results. The attempt to add training to the total
productive effort of Soviet civilians required an impossibly great effort. Results were achieved only
for a few critical months and in a few special fields.
One of the most significant aspects of the Soviet
employment of semi-military organizations was the
care exercised to insure effective coordination with
the strictly military effort, to prevent the growth of
a vast competing structure, and to avoid duplication
of effort.
The State Defense Committee maintained control
over all semi-military agencies, although the General
Headquarters directed NKVD, NKGB, and Partisan
operations. Each organization was charged with
strictly delimited functions. In several instances,
notably the NKVD, prewar functions were reduced.
Thus the NKVD lost its control over army intelligence, counterintelligence, and secret operations.
It consequently was denied conditions favorable for
grandiose usurption of the military effort, such as
was exercised by the SS in Germany. The volunte8r Osoaviakhim was relegated to a secondary role
during World War II. It was supervised strictly by
the Communist Party so as to prevent its operation
as the nucleus of any dissident movement.
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Most semi-military organizations resumed their
civilian roles with the termination of martial law in
October 1945. Signal communications and transportation no longer are militarized. Military training, other than regular recruit training, now is voluntary and semiofficial.
The NKVD and NKGB, however, are of even
greater importance than during World War II.
They are insuring the orderly demobilization of the
army, the effective integration of dischargees into
the civilian population, and the careful screening of
the future peacetime army to guarantee its complete
political reliability.

Section I. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT
OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. GENERAL

The Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs
{NKVD) is responsible for maintenance of the security of the Soviet Union.
It conducts frontier and coastal patrols, controls
all local police and fire departments, maintains special mobile forces for use against sabotage or insurrection, and is in charge of all prisons.
The local police functions involve the NKVD in
the maintenance of internal passport control; birth
certificates, and other vital statistics. Its control
over local fire departments gives it over-all control
of passive antiaircraft defense in time of war. Finally, the control of prison labor involves the Commissariat in extensive construction, mining, and
development projects. All roads and highways are
responsibilities of the Commissariat.
The NKVD is a Union-Republican Commissariat
and consequently has corresponding organizations
in the republics. Not all of the main administrations of the Commissariat, however, have counterparts in the republics (fig. 1).
The Main Administration of Border Troops, for
example, is organized directly into Border Guard
Districts. Railroad troops and other interior troops
remain mobile under central control. Although
prisoners are controlled directly by the Main Administration of Labor and Prisoner-of-W ar Camps, their
productive efforts normally are directed by special
trusts such as Dalstroi, a trust for the economic
development of the Kolyma area in the Far East.
Semi-military forces of the NKVD include Border
Troops, Interior Troops, Signal Troops, Police
Troops (militia), and Fire Defense Troops. The
Commissariat's troops normally are selected from reliable Party members. Their great strength, at one
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time well over half a million, attests to the importance of their activities during World War II.
2. BORDER AND SECURITY TROOPS

The Border Troops of the NKVD are charged with
the supervision and security of the land and sea
frontier. They are organized into Border Districts
manned by Border Battalions (fig. 2), whose duties
include border and coastal patrol, counterespionage
and customs control. They do not garrison fortifications.
Border Battalions, averaging from 1,000 to 1,200
in strength, control the First, or Border, Zone of the
U. S. S. R. The First Zone extends approximately
9 miles from the actual boundary. Only border
troops and special construction units are permitted

-----------------

1ST BORDER
COMMAND

9

to enter the zone, except at control points. Every
installation and road is guarded 24 hours a day.
No movement is permitted at night, except mounted
or foot patrols accompanied by dogs.
A Border Battalion's zone is approximately 60
miles wide, although it may be extended in areas of
poor communications. Elements of the NKVD Air
Brigade assist Border Battalions in difficult terrain.
The Air Brigade is directly subordinate to the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs. It includes a
number of air regiments and independent squadrons.
During World War II, the organization of Border
Troops in theaters of operations was modified. The
Border Troops were redesignated as Security Troops
of the Rear Area of the Red Army. They were as-

NKVD BORDER
BATTALION

NKGB DISTRICT
ADMINISTRA TION

20 BORDER
COMMAND

TO 12
MILES

3 TO 5

MILES

Figure 2. Organization and deplorment 0/ a NKVD border battalion.
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signed the mission of apprehension of enemy agents,
parachute troops, and Red Army stragglers or deserters. They also guarded rear area installations
and maintained straggler lines. The Security Troops
of the Rear Area of the Red Army were withdrawn
from the Main Administration of Border Troops and
placed under separate administrative control.
The former Border Battalions were organized into
Security Regiments, subordinate to army groups
(fronts) and commanded by the Chief of the Security Troops of the Rear Area.
Normally, one Security Regiment was assigned
to the rear area of each army, and five to six regiments to the rear area of each army group.
Each Security Regiment consisted of three rifle
battalions, a machine gun company, a reconnaissance company, a submachine gun company, a signal
communications company, an antitank company, an
engineer platoon, and maintenance, chemical warfare, and transport units. Artillery was attached as
required. The strength of each regiment was approximately 1,650 officers and enlisted men.
3. INTERIOR TROOPS

The Interior Troops of the NKVD constitute mobile
forces to insure the security of the state. They include Operational Troops, Railway Troops, Convoy
Troops, and Factory Guards.
Operational Troops are charged with destruction
of enemy elements in the interior and in the rear of
the Red Army, suppression of insurrection, and protection of key installations and individuals. They
also guard railroads and prisoners when necessary.
Their organization has been subject to several
changes. Before World War II, they were organized into corps, regiments, battalions, and companies. The corps were reorganized into divisions of
approximately eight regiments each early in the war,
Approximately five of the regiments were similar to
NKVD Security Regiments, organized from Border
Battalions, one to two were motorized, and one was a
cavalry regiment. By 1944, the divisions were being motorized, cavalry largely had been grouped into
separate divisions, and brigades of two to three
regiments and two to three separate battalions were
being organized within each military district.
At present, the divisions are believed to be
equipped with tanks and to approach the Red Army
mechanized corps in size-approximately 15,000
officers and enlisted men-and in fire power. The
brigades appear to be flexible semimobile organizatiolli! similar to the Security Regiments.

Missions of the divisions and brigades of the
NKVD are different. The divisions provide a cen·
tralized mobile force for maintenance of state security. During the World War II, they were committed for operations, particularly anti-Partisan
actions and mopping up of enemy remnants, in the
rear of army groups under the army group Chief of
Security Troops. The brigades, however, provide
internal security within the military districts. Both
conduct defensive operations against airborne
forces.
The Railway Troops are charged with the defense
of railroad lines. They employ armored trains and
cooperate closely with Railroad Station Commandants of the Red Army, who are charged with the defense of terminals, stations, and depots. Railway
Troops are organized into divisions, brigades, regiments, and separate battalions. Divisions in active
operational zones have as many as 10 armored
trains.
The Convoy Troops protect the movement of
troops, supplies, and prisoners on the roads, railroads, and waterways. They also insure the uninterrupted movement of convoys. Although their
major functions apply to the zone of the interior,
their commitment extends to the rear areas of armies.
Normally, they are concentrated in the zone of main
effort. Convoy Troops are organized into divisions,
each containing up to five regiments.
The Factory Guards provide local and interior
protection for major industries.
4. SIGNAL TROOPS

The Signal Troops of the NKVD were organized in
1943 as a separate administration directly under the
Commissariat to improve the communications security of the Red Army and of the Peoples' Commissariat of Signal Communications. Their mission
includes monitoring of both friendly and enemy
broadcasts, and the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of signal communication systems for
staffs and units of the NKVD.
One Signal Regiment is subordinate to the Chief
of Security Troops of each army group. Each Signal Regiment includes three operating battalions and
two signal construction companies. Its strength is
approximately 1,000 officers and enlisted men.
5. POLICE TROOPS

The Police Troops (militia) of the NKVD are a
uniformed force to suppress crime and control
traffic. They also playa major role in state security
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through comprehensive control of passports and vital statistics. Police representation on all draft
boards and in reception centers assures the political
reliability of all inductees. All changes in resi·
dence, travel applications, births, and deaths must
be reported to the police, normally within 24 hours.
Police control is especially stringent within the
Second and Third Border Zones. The Second Zone
extends approximately 60 miles in depth from the
boundary. All inhabitants in it are examined carefully by the police to determine their political reliability. Unreliable elements are sent further into the
interior. Travel within the Second Zone is permitted only with special passes.
The Third, or Alertness, Zone extends still deeper.
The population in this Zone is supervised carefully
and is specially indoctrinated to cooperate with the
Police Troops and other agencies of the NKVD in
the apprehension of suspicious characters. Travel
in the Third Zone is controlled.
Police Troops are organized on a Union-Republican basis. Consequently, police headquarters are
attached to all political subdivisions down to district
or Oblast level. Police troops are organized into
regiments, battalions, companies, and platoons.
Each unit is much larger than corresponding units
in the Red Army.
Service in the Police Troops was on a volunteer
basis prior to 1941. Periods of enlistment were 2
years. Men who had served in the Red Army constituted the majority of personnel. Volunteers
could join at 18. They could remain in the
service and be exempt from military service if
their performance was satisfactory. Women were
recruited' extensively for Police Troops during
World War II.
6. FIRE DEFENSE TROOPS

The Main Administration of Fire Defense of the
NKVD, assisted by the Central Research Institute of
Fire Defense, controls the Fire Defense Troops. In
time of peace, they are charged with local fire protection.
During World War II, the organization was
changed into the Main Administration for Passive
Antiaircraft Defense. The regional counterparts of
the Main Administration controlled Passive Antiaircraft Defense G'roups conscripted from local popu·
lations. They were responsible for preparatory
measures against air raids, air-raid warning systems,
camouflage, camouflage discipline, defense against
chemical attack, damage control, and first aid.
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The operations of the Main Administration for
Antiaircraft Defense were integrated closely with
those of the Main Administration of Antiaircraft
Defense Forces (GUPVO) of the Red Army, with
the Osoaviakhim, and with the Commissariats of
Transportation and Signal Communications.
The Commander of the operational staff for
Passive Antiaircraft Defense in each political subdivision was in direct communication with the
GUPVO Commander, who was responsible for the
active fighter and antiaircraft defense of the area.
The visual observation systems of Passive Antiaircraft Defense were integrated fully with the observers and radar of the GUPVO.
Regional staffs of the Passive Antiaircraft Defense
Main Administration controlled the passive defense
of signal and railroad installations. Because such
installations were major targets, they were provided
with direct communications to the air warning
center. Special damage repair brigades were provided for them.
Local air-raid defenses were based upon thorough
preparation of shelters and full mobilization of the
population. All air-raid shelters had to be approved
by the local antiaircraft defense staff, a ~edical
inspector, and construction organizations.
A Passive Antiaircraft Defense Group was organized in residences or apartments for every 200 to
500 population. One Group was organized for every
100 to 300 population in factories and other installations. All.able-bodied men between 16 and 60 and
all able-hodied women between 18 and 50 were sub·
ject to compulsory service in the Fire Defense
forces. They served in both their place of residence
and their place of work. The sole exceptions were
persons on active duty with the Red Army or the
NKVD.
Each Passive Antiaircraft Defense Group included
a Commander, his deputy, and five detachments.
Strengths of the detachments were 'as follows:
Detachment
Strength
Control and observation____________________________
6
9
Fire defense_______________________________________
Anti-chemicaL_____________________________________
5
Repair and damage controL ___________________ ,..____
7
~edical___________________________________________
4

Each Group maintained a reserve of not less than
25 percent of its strength.
The Main Administration for Passive Antiaircraft
Defense shareQ the responsibility for civilian :ldense
training with the Osoaviakhim, the nation-wide \"01-
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untary defense association of the U. S. S. R. Joint
training regulations and a special 40-hour training
program were prepared.
Fire Defense Troops were trained to form the.
nucleus of Partisan bands should theil," area be over·
run by the enemy.

Section II. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT
OF STATE SECURITY
1. GENERAL

The Peoples' Commissariat of State Security
(NKGB) was organized in 1943 to assume the functions of counterespionage and strategic foreign
espionage which had been handled by a special division of the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
Reconnaissance, tactical espionage, and counterintelligence operations within the Red Army, however, were conducted by the Red Army itself. Overt
surveillance of the civilian population and signal
security remained functions of the NKVD.
The NKGB is a Union-Republican Commissariat,
but counterparts of the national organization have
been established in few of the republics and political
subdivisions of the U. S. S. R.
2. ORGANIZATION

Functions of the Commissariat of State Security are
performed by a number of administrations and
divisions.
The Foreign Countries Administration organizes
and conducts espionage outside of the U. S. S. R.
It is believed to be composed of regional divisions.
The Administration also is concerned with Soviet
propaganda abroad.
The Occupied Territories Administration supervised and controlled Soviet nationals in enemy-occupied territory during W orld War II. It is not
known whether this administration still exists. It
may continue to conduct surveillance of Soviet nationals in areas outside direct Red Army control. It
is believed that this administration was concerned
primarily with political reliability and that it took
little or no part in the conduct of Partisan operations.
The Secret Political Administration investigates
anti-Soviet activities and organizations within the
U. S. S. R. It maintains secret surveillance of the
loyalty of Communist Party members.
The Administration for Counterespionage in the
Soviet Economy is charged with the responsibility of
preventing foreign economic espionage and sabo-

tage. It is charged with security control over industrial installations and output and over the fiscal
position of the U. S. S. R.
The Counterintelligence Administration is concerned principally with control of the activities of
foreigners in the U. S. S. R. It also watches Soviet
citizens of foreign birth or suspected of foreign
affiliations.
Other administrations and divisions of the Peoples' Commissariat of State Security are charged
with mail censorship, telephone and telegraph communications, secret surveillance within prisons, etc.
The Commissariat of State Security, unlike the
Commissariat of Internal Affairs, maintains no
troops or armed forces of its own. It operates
through small groups or individuals, largely under
cover. It has, however, official militarized status.
Its personnel are given military rank and the privileges of general officers.

Section III. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT
OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS
1. GENERAL

The Peoples' Commissariat of Signal Communications (NKS) , a Union-Republican Commissariat, is
responsible for the majority of Soviet signal communications systems. However, it is not responsible for combat zone communications, the internal
communications of the Peoples' Commissariat of
Internal Affairs, the railroad signal system, or the
internal communications systems of the navy. It
does include the postal, telephone, and telegraph
services.
The Commissariat cooperates closely·with both the
Peoples' Commissariat of National Defense and the
Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Its personnel were placed under full military discipline
during World War II.
The close relations between the Commissariats of
Signal Communications and Defense during most of
World War II were reinforced by the appointment of
the Commissar of Signal Communications, Ivan T.
Peresypkin, as Chief Marshal of Signal Troops and
Chief of the Signal Division of the Red Army General Staff.
2. RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMY

COMMUNICA~

TIONS

The Peoples' Commissariat of Signal Communications maintains and operates all communications in
the area of army group (front) headquarters, except
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those direct to the GHQ. The Commissariat is reo
sponsible for the development, production, and ini·
tial supply of Red Army signal equipment, powerful
radio stations, charging equipment, and other operations beyond- the capabilities of Red Army signal
troops.
3. ORGANIZATION

The Peoples' Commissariat of Signal Communications is known to include Main Administrations for
the Postal Service, Signal Operations, and Signal
Construction. It also includes a number of research
and training institutes.
Coordination with the armed forces is the responsibility of the Central Military Administration of
the Commissariat.

Section IV. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT
OF TRANSPORTATION
1. GENERAL

The Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation
(NKPS) is an All-Union Commissariat charged
with the maintenance and operation of all railroads,
including the Moscow subway.
Prior to 1931 the Commissariat controlled all
types of transportation. During 1931, however, responsibility for all transportation other than rail was
transferred to other commissariats. The Commissariat of Transportation was militarized in April
1943. Employees were compelled to remain on their
jobs for the duration of the war. They were placed
under the Red Army disciplinary code and were
made subject to military tribunals. Special uniforms and military ranks were introduced in September 1943.
Thirty-nine railroad divisions have been identified. Generally, they correspond to the military
districts.
Activities of the Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation are conducted through the following
agencies:
Departments :
Political.
Central Operating.
Central Locomotive.
Central Car.
Car and Track Maintenance.
Signal Communications.
New Railroad Construction.
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Central Sections:
Supply.
Economic Planning.
Finance.
Mobilization.
Lumber.
ElecU:ification.
Personnel Training.
Sanitary.
Accounting.
Administration.
Central Bureau for Foreign Relations.
2. COORDINATION

Coordination is effected between the Commissariat
of Transportation and the Chief of the Rear Services
of the Red Army, between the Chiefs of Railroad
Divisions and the Chiefs of Transportation of the
Rear Services of army groups (front), between the
Chiefs of Railroad Divisions and the Chiefs of
Transportation of military districts, and between
the Transportation Commissariat Station Masters
and the Railroad Station or Railhead Commandants.
3. MOVEMENTS

The planning and execution of major troop, supply,
or evacuation movements by rail is the joint responsibility of the Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation and the Chief of Transportation of the Rear
Services of the Red Army.
Major military movements normally must be
planned 30 days in advance because of the demands
made on the limited Soviet rail systems. The
Transportation Commissariat must be prepared to
inform the Red Army of its rolling stock and transport capabilities 25 days before the movement.
Twenty-three days before the movement, the Chiefs
of Transportation of the army groups and military
districts involved must forward their estimated requirementsfor the movement to the Chief of Transportation of the Rear Services of the Red Army,
who must submit his consolidated request to the
Commissariat of Transportation.
Should the request exceed the estimated capabilities submitted by the Commissariat, the problem is
referred to the Supreme Economic Council or to the
State Defense Committee for adjudication. Adjudication must be completed and a joint CommissariatRed Army plan must be transmitted to the Chiefs of
Transportation of the army groups and military districts at least 13 days before the movement. The
Chiefs of Transportation and the Railroad Divisions
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must have prepared their detailed joint plans and
must have transmitted them as warning orders to
military formations, railroad units, and industrial
enterprises concerned at least 10 days before the
movement.
4. RESPONSIBILITY
The maintenance of epidemiological and epizootic
control on all railroads is a special responsibility of
the Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation. The
Commissariat maintains medical and veterinary
inspectors on all trains and special infectious hos·
pitals at major stations and all railheads. The Main
Medical Administration and the Veterinary Admin·
istration of the Red Army share in this responsi.
bility.
The Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation is
responsible for the operation of all railroads up to
army railheads. It is responsible for all permanent
and heavy construction, even in advance of army
railheads. The Railroad Construction Battalions of
the Red Army are, however, responsible for initial
mine clearance.
Coordination between the Chiefs of Railroad Divi·
sions and the Chiefs of Transportation of military
districts is limited to planning, epidemiological and
epizootic control, and supervision of the Transporta'
tion Commissariat Station Masters and the Station
Commandants.
Station masters have sole authority over the operations of railroad lines, rolling stock repair, rail line
construction and repair, and railroad signal communications.
Station and railhead commandants of the Red
Army are responsible for the orderly loading and
unloading of troops, equipment, and supplies, the
successful operation and maintenance of Red Army
dumps and depots, and the active defense of stations.
They exercise the disciplinary authority of garrison
commanders over all troops and other personnel in
transit or at stations. In defensive situations, it is
believed that they have tactical command over all
personnel in their sectors, including Transportation
Commissariat Troops, Railroad and Convoy Troops,
and the local Passive Antiaircraft Defense Groups
(in the zone of interior) .

Section V. SEMI-MILITARY TRAINING
ORGANIZATIONS
1. GENERAL
Appreciation of the necessity for widespread interest
and voluntary participation in military activities

outside of the official organizations of the army
dates from 1912, when a national society was organ.
ized for semi-military training. Following the Revolution, many Soviet citizens and the Communist
Party realized the need for supplementing the limited
conscript training of the Red Army of the early
twenties.
Consequently, various societies were
formed to accomplish this function.
The societies were merged in 1926 into the Organization for the Defense of the Soviet Union and
Defense against Air Raids and Chemical Attack
(Osoaviakhim,\ . The Komsomol (League of Com.
munist Youth) and its children's affiliates, the Pio·
neers and the Octobrists, formed the core of Osoa·
viakhim. Defense training outside of the army became virtually compulsory for Soviet youth.
Although Osoaviakhim, and particularly its
Komsomol, achieved considerable success, the status
of universal military preparedness was not satisfactory at the beginning of the war with Germany.
Consequently, military control and compulsory participation in prescribed training courses were instituted in 1941 with the organization of the Main
Administration for Universal Compulsory Military
Training of the Citizens of the U. S. S. R. (Vsevobuch) of the Peoples' Commissariat of Defense.
Osoaviakhim was relegated to a secondary and
supplementary role for the duration of W orId War
II. The State Defense Committee required the or·
ganization to turn its facilities over to the newly
formed Vsevobuch. Osoaviakhim conducted passive antiaircraft and elementary aviation training,
conducted war-bond drives, and assisted in mine
clearance and collection of enemy weapons and
equipment in recaptured areas. With the conclusion of the war and the termination of Vsevobuch,
Osoaviakhim once more is the primary auxiliary
military training organization of the U. S. S. R.
2. OSOAVIAKHIM AND KOMSOMOL
Osoaviakhim is comprised of a pyramidal series of
local, blast, and republican organizations. It is
directed by the All-Union Presidium.
The organization expanded rapidly following its
formation. Its membership totaled 2,950,000 in
October 1927 and reached 13,000,000 in 1941. As
early as 1929, there were 47,200 organized groups
for the study of military science. Osoaviakhim was
actively engaged in aviation training. In 1931, it
had 14 glider stations, 40 airfields, flying schools,
model airplane shops, and centers for training aviation mechanics.

o

IV-9

15 Mar 46

TM 30-430
Although Osoaviakhim was designed to provide
military and physical training for citizens of pre-conscript age, it also included former members of the
Red Army who wished to study new technical developments in warfare. Its program, which centered about clubs and training centers, included
virtually all types of military training.
Markedly close relations are maintained between
Osoaviakhim, the state, the Communist Party, and
the armed forces. The Soviet government has
supported the organization strongly. It has authorized the use of army reserve personnel, giving them
active pay duty.
The organization of Osoaviakhim has been
changed for peacetime operations. The clubs have
been replaced by military-type units, infantry or
cavalry squads or platoons and detachments of specialists. The Communist Party supervises the selection of unit commanders, often reserve officers or
noncommissioned officers on deferred status.
The Komsomol of the Communist Party specializes in tank, artillery, and marksmanship training.
Red Army personnel on active duty often have served
as its officers.
3. VSEVOBUCH

The Main Administration for Universal Compulsory
Military Training of the Citizens of the U. S. S. R.
(Vsevobuch) , which existed between 1941 and 1945,
had the mission of providing a reserve for the Red
Army and for Partisan operations. It conducted
training for all male citizens between the ages of
16 and 60.
A special 110-hour training program was given
trainees during their off-duty hours, without interruption of production and without pay. Regulations
provided that the program must be completed in not
more than 5 months and that classes must meet at
least twice a week. Instruction was presented by
reserve officers and noncommissioned officers recruited from wounded Red Army personnel. Training was specialized by arm. Insofar as was practicable, the training organizations corresponded to
units and elements of the Red Army, but had no
military status.
The program achieved only partial success due to
the inadequate supply of instructors and equipment.
Best results appear to have been achieved in the
initial training of specialists, such as signal men
whose courses extended far beyond the initial 110
hours.
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Section VI. PARTISANS
1. DEVELOPMENT AND MISSION

Partisan operations have always been an important
factor in wars fought on Soviet territory. The large,
inaccessible areas and the robustness of the Soviet
population favor this type of operation.
The mission of Partisan warfare is to harass
enemy forces, to cut their extended supply and communication lines, to assist Red Army operations, and
to gather information about the enemy.
The Soviet government and the Communist Party,
with the Komsomol, made preparations before
World War II for the foundation of a Partisan movement. The Osoaviakhim and the Fire Defense
Troops assisted in this preparation, and later in the
actual organization of Partisan bands. V sevobuch
also assisted in the formation of Partisan bands after
1941.
During World War II, the development of Partisan bands was greatly facilitated by the German
Army's inability to mop up the large territories captured during its rapid advance. Special recruiting
agencies of the Communist Party in the rear of the
enemy forces furnished the Partisans. with a steady
flow of replacements. It is estimated that more
than 300,000 Partisans were operating behind German lines at the end of 1943.
The Soviet Partisan command also assisted Partisan bands in other countries under German occupation, such as Yugoslavia, Slovakia, and Poland.
2. HIGH COMMAND AND COORDINATION WITH
RED ARMY

The Communist Party supervised and controlled the
Partisans. The High Command of the Partisans
was the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement, first
under Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov and
later under General· Leitenant Ponomarenko. The
Staff is responsible directly to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
The Central Staff of the Partisan Movement was
represented in the General Headquarters and coordinated with the Operations and Intelligence Division of the Red Army to assure closest cooperation
with the Red Army.
When the Red Army went on the offensive, much
closer coordination was required. Special Partisan
staffs were organized at army group (front) and
army levels to achieve this coordination (fig. 3).
The Operations Staff of the Partisan Movement in
the Rear of the Enemy was organized in enemy-
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occupied territory to receive orders from the Partisan High Command and to assure the dissemination
of orders to individual Partisan bands.

had sufficient supplies of weapons. Limited transportation was available to Partisans. It normally
consisted of light horse-drawn carts.

3. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

4. TACTICS
In general, the Partisans operated on orders from
the Partisan High Command to carry out specific
operations. When the Red Army went on the offensive, Partisan units usually were confined to operations which gave direct assistance to the advance
elements of Red Army assault forces. They also
assisted the Red Army by gathering information
about the enemy, often employing children, women,
and the aged for these missions.
Surprise raids and ambushes were characteristic
Partisan operations. They usually operated at night,
often near woods and marshes. Partisan bands normally avoided engagements with strong enemy
forces. After a successful raid, they returned to
their bases by separate routes. They continually
changed their positions, marching by night and hiding by day.
When Partisan units were surrounded, they broke
up into small groups which attempted to pass
through the enemy lines or hid in the surrounded
area.
Partisan units employed a markedly effective
security system of sentries, patrols, and advance
observation posts. Roads leading to their camps
normally were camouflaged and mined. Excellent
communications were maintained by the use of radio
and messengers.

The organization, equipment, and strength of Partisan bands varied greatly. They depended upon
terrain conditions, density of the road net, and the
strength of enemy forces.
The most commonly found unit was the Partisan
battalion (Otryad), with 200 to 400 officers and
enlisted men. In favorable terrain, battalions were
often combined into brigades and, early in the war,
into regiments (Polk). In very few instances, Partisan divisions (Divisia) were organized.
Partisan units were composed of personnel received from the Communist Party and semi-military
organizations, of isolated Red Army soldiers, and of
escaped prisoners of war.
The types and quantity of weapons, equipment,
and supplies used by the Partisans, largely depended
upon the initiative of the units and the success of
Partisan raids on enemy supply depots and columns.
Battlefields also were a source of supply.
Partisans normally did not receive supplies from
the Red Army or the Soviet government, except for
medical supplies usually delivered by air. When
Partisan units were in contact with Red Army units,
however, they were able to obtain equipment.
Most of the food for the Partisans was obtained
from the local population and was supplemented by
supplies seized from enemy dumps. They generally
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